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          Blessed are the [poor] for they shall inherit the earth.1
This biblical aphorism is being realized at an alarming pace. Almost half the      world’s six billion people live under the poverty line of two dollars a day:
1.2 billion people earn less than one dollar a day and are in the extreme poverty
category.2  By the year 2020, the globe likely will add two billion more people, 95
percent of whom will reside in the developing world.3   Absent any dramatic shift in
policy priorities, the poor may indeed inherit the earth in the lifetimes of most of
us.
The implications of these demographic realities for the earth’s well-being have
many dimensions. They include the loss of forest cover and biodiversity as well as
the spread of infectious disease and food insecurity, to name but a few. This predict-
able population growth will create huge mega-cities as urbanization growth trends
in the developing world continue unabated. It will also create an explosion of young
The Link
Between Poverty
and Violent Conflict
J. Brian Atwood
The threat to the international system from the many forms of violent conflict,
terrorism being the most prominent among them, is greater today than it was at
the end of the twentieth century. This escalation of global conflict has been
attributed to the breakup of the Soviet State, increasing ethnic tensions, weak
governance at both the nation-state and international levels, and the rise of
religious extremism. Each of these factors contributes to instability and the
social tensions that lead to violence. It will be posited here that there is also a
significant link between poverty and violent conflict, one that has been largely
underestimated by national security analysts.
    I will argue that a strong correlation exists between conditions of underdevel-
opment and the various forms of conflict. This suggests that the failure to
recognize the link between security and development has reduced the effective-
ness of the more traditional methods of preventing or mitigating conflict, that
is, the use of military force, diplomacy, intelligence sharing, and international
law.  Finally, I will discuss new development interventions and improved coor-
dination and policy coherence measures to confront directly the conditions that
produce violent conflict.
Brian Atwood is the dean of the Hubert Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs and served as
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people in the developing world at a time when the populations of Western nations
will be aging dramatically.
Does all of this mean that more violent conflict is inevitable?  Some scholars hold
that there is no empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that conditions of pov-
erty cause conflict.4  Pervasive poverty alone is not a sufficient condition to create a
major conflict, or even to cause an individual to commit an act of violence. Yet,
many studies show that there is a strong correlation between the absence of material
well-being and the prospects for violence, from crime in inner-city neighborhoods5
to instability in poor nations. 6
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, in their 1997 study of neighborhoods and
violent crime, examined race and class segregation in poor Chicago neighborhoods
and its impact on “collective efficacy,” or social cohesion among neighbors. They
found that “alienation, exploitation, and dependency wrought by resource depriva-
tion acts as a centrifugal force that stymies collective efficacy.” The greater the
 effect of this resource deprivation — a phenomenon the authors called the “concen-
trated disadvantage” factor — the stronger the correlation to the level of violence.7
The study by Sampson and others focused on race and class issues within Ameri-
can society, which, because of its egalitarian ethos, may intensify individual feelings
of alienation and exploitation. This may limit the study’s value in examining the
effects of poverty in developing nations. But “alienation, exploitation, and depen-
dency” are highly relevant factors there as well. They cause social and political
stress both within poor nations and between poor and rich regions, especially in an
information age when social and economic discrepancies are more obvious.
Governments in the developing world and donor agencies supporting their devel-
opment agendas are facing much the same “centrifugal force” referred to in the
Sampson study. The report of the Commission on Global Governance entitled “Our
Global Neighborhood”  was alluding to Sampson’s “concentrated disadvantage”
factor when it stated that “absolute poverty provides scant basis either for the main-
tenance of traditional society or for any further development of participation in civic
life and governance . . . unfair in themselves, poverty and extreme disparities of
income fuel both guilt and envy when made more visible by global television.”8
That awareness of “extreme disparities of income” should cause both guilt and
envy should not be surprising. How this relates to the need for “social cohesion” and
the political integration necessary for a state to function and to prevent outbreaks of
violence are crucial to this discussion. The World Bank report entitled “Breaking the
Conflict Trap” argues that an unequal distribution of wealth exacerbates societal
tensions and “increases the perception of relative deprivation.” This, in turn, the
report states, leads to “perceived grievances and potential strife.”9  While this re-
ferred specifically to the distribution of wealth within a nation-state, the widening
gap between income in the developed world and the developing world also increases
the perception of relative deprivation and has real implications for global gover-
nance.
The report on state failure, prepared under the auspices of the University of
Maryland by several scholars on behalf of the United States intelligence community,
examined the correlation between several development factors and the failure of
state institutions.10  Such failure correlated strongest with three factors:  infant mor-
tality rates, fragile democratic institutions, and dependency on imports. Each of
these factors contributes to the “centrifugal force that stymies collective efficacy,” to
use the language of the Sampson study.11   Certainly, parents feel deprived when their
children are dying of diseases that they know can be treated in the developed world.
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Fragile democracies that provide universal suffrage, but do not have the institutional
capacity to manage social stress, are clearly vulnerable to collapse. Economies that
cannot produce sufficient goods and services internally and service only their elite
with imports are bound to have severe distribution of wealth issues. The report con-
cludes: “Empirically the most striking pattern is that civil war is heavily concen-
trated in the poorest countries . . . . The key root cause of conflict is the failure of
economic development.” 12
The condition of poverty may not be sufficient in itself to cause widespread con-
flict, but these studies clearly show that poverty, more than any other factor, contrib-
utes to feelings of “alienation, exploitation, and dependency” and these feelings in
turn contribute to a breakdown of social cohesion and to violent conflict. The
nations that are most vulnerable to this phenomenon possess an inadequate level of
social cohesion in the first instance. Many have top-heavy bureaucratic structures
and weak legal systems. Their poorest citizens are often forced to live and work
outside the legal framework of their society. As Hernando DeSoto has demonstrated
in his research, surviving and protecting one’s meager assets in this illegal state (the
so-called informal sector), requires considerable guile, alliances with criminal
elements, and, frequently, a resort to violence.13   This need to exist within an unpro-
tected illegal environment coupled with other forms of deprivation, such as food
insecurity, environmental degradation, unsustainable urban population growth, and
infectious disease, produces antisocial behavior, anger, and desperation.
The Poverty-Terrorism Link
The link between poverty and terrorism is more difficult to demonstrate than the
link between poverty and conflict. Terrorist networks that have operated over the
past twenty years have been led by educated people of means. Groups such as the
Irish Republican Army, the Basque group ETA, Al Qaeda, and Hamas have been
motivated by serious political grievances or extreme religious beliefs, or some
combination of both. But scholars who have studied the modus operandi of these
groups have observed that they invariably have exploited the conditions of poverty
to expand the political appeal of their cause and recruit their foot soldiers.14  In
addition, extremely poor nations have been unable or unwilling to reject these well-
endowed organizations and thus have become safe harbors for them.
The U.S. government endorsed this view of the terrorism threat in its controver-
sial National Security Strategy (which also creates a justification for pre-emptive
military strikes). In a letter accompanying this new doctrine, President Bush
addressed the threats posed by states weakened by failing institutions and poverty:
The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can
pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.  Poverty does not make
poor people into terrorists and murderers.  Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption
can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their
borders.
The effort to defeat or marginalize terrorist organizations must integrate all of the
elements of a nation’s national security establishment. Military power is necessary,
although, as we have seen, it has its limitations. Indeed, misuse of military power
can reduce the effectiveness of other instruments. Diplomacy is essential to gain the
cooperation of other nations and to enhance the effectiveness of international legal
New England Journal of Public Policy
162
and enforcement mechanisms. Accurate intelligence information and precise analysis
of local situations are also crucial. All of these tools are enhanced when governments
are cooperating widely to attack poverty, a  significant cause of alienation and an-
ger.15  Can this be done more effectively under a new paradigm of international de-
velopment cooperation?
Development for Security
If we are to take effective action against the conditions of poverty that contribute
most to violent conflict, it is first necessary to recognize the constraints we face
within governments and internationally. These are quite severe and will require a
dramatic change in outlook.
First, there are limited resources available for development. The Development
Assistance Committee (OECD) “volume” reports over the past five years have
reflected an official development assistance (ODA) level of between $52 billion and
$58 billion. This worldwide sum seems a healthy amount, but it pales next to the
$478 billion the United States spends on its military budget.16  In addition, most of
this amount is directed at developing nations that are already committed to reform
and thus make good partners. Two types of nations are generally excluded as recipi-
ents of assistance:  emerging economies with large pockets of poor citizens and
heavily skewed distributions of wealth, and weak, poorly performing nations.
Second, while donor nations have targeted extreme poverty — the 1990 Millen-
nium Challenge Goals of the UN vow to reduce by one-half the approximately 1.2
billion who earn less than a dollar a day — most of these people are beyond the
reach of traditional programs in that they are not part of the formal economy.
Traditional development programs are normally implemented through governments,
which are reluctant to acknowledge the existence of the informal sector or to change
the status quo.17
Third, governments tend to place more emphasis on mainstream national security
objectives than on development strategies. For example, Western governments are
more interested in preserving their industrial base by conserving their access to oil
or expanding international trade and investment opportunities.18  While developing
new markets may be a long-range goal, it is difficult for governments that operate
on annual budgets to see beyond the horizon.
Fourth, because development objectives are not only secondary to mainstream
national security objectives but also are long-term and preventive in nature, there is
little incentive to adopt more coherent approaches to the challenge of eradicating
poverty. Thus, while limited resources are devoted to development projects, much
larger amounts are expended, for example, to subsidize agricultural exports. In
addition, international financial decisions taken though the International Monetary
Fund tend to emphasize macro-economic stability often at the expense of develop-
ment or growth strategies.19
A New Paradigm
Overcoming these significant constraints will require an acceptance of the real
threat constituted by growing poverty. Currently, the desire to pursue a comprehen-
sive effort that would include development cooperation is absent from the effort to
defeat terrorism. Part of the challenge is proper analysis of the threat. The other is a
failure to see beyond the current crisis. What is needed is a new “culture of preven-
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tion” that will re-order resource priorities and create institutions capable of taking
cooperative, preemptive steps rather than waiting for crises to develop.20
On the analytical side, what is missing in the current assessments is a develop-
ment perspective. A study by Canadian Bernard Wood for the Emergency Response
Division (ERD) of the UN Development Programme advocated improved analyses
of the areas of underdevelopment in nations vulnerable to crises. In other words,
areas that are most likely to create social tension and conflict are largely ignored.
Development experts are more likely to consider these issues carefully than are
traditional intelligence analysts.21  Early warning systems that incorporate a
development perspective could in turn transform decision-making and enable gov-
ernments to intervene more quickly with assistance in a timely manner.
What types of interventions are most conducive to preventing a state from losing
social cohesion and spinning into violent conflict? The world’s bilateral and multi-
lateral donor agencies and the United Nations system have undertaken a number of
studies in recent years on how best to support global efforts to combat terrorism and
to prevent  violent conflict. A recent report by the Development Assistance Commit-
tee (DAC) of the OECD entitled “A Development Co-Operation Lens on Terrorism
Prevention” offers several possibilities.22  It builds on a 2001 DAC report entitled
“Helping Prevent Violent Conflict.” That these helpful reports have received so little
attention is a reflection of the limited mindset that characterizes today’s national
security establishments.
The premise of the DAC report is that “terrorism is a form of violent conflict and
conflict prevention is an integral part of the quest to reduce poverty.” The report
points out that development cooperation cannot directly address “all the ‘root causes’
of terrorism,” but it does have an important role to play. “Many conditions that al-
low terrorists to be politically successful, build and expand constituencies, find re-
cruits, establish and finance terrorist organizations, and secure safe-havens fall
within the realm and primary concerns of development co-operation,”  according to
the DAC report.23
The specific interventions recommended by the DAC report are revealing in that
they attempt to ameliorate the conditions of “concentrated disadvantage” that the
Sampson study suggests contribute most to the unraveling of “social cohesion.”24
Among the interventions designed to “dissuade disaffected groups from embracing
terrorism and other forms of violent conflict” were the following:
• Support community-driven development to build the capacity of
communities to resist extreme religious and political ideologies
based on violence. Encourage intra- and inter-faith exchanges
   • Help build effective and responsible media and public information
strategies as powerful tools to prevent violence
   • Give greater attention in donor programming to young people’s
job opportunities and education to prevent the emergence of
fragile, disenfranchised youth
   • Support democratization and modernization from within local
value systems to reconfirm and build the beliefs of societies
   • Stay engaged and work in fragile, conflict-prone societies no
matter how difficult the partnership may become  (my emphasis)
   • Strive to make globalization an inclusive process, which will help
reduce support for terrorism.  This requires an increased aid effort
as well as greater policy coherence (my emphasis). 25
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This and other reports by development professionals have been largely ignored by
governments that are otherwise seized with concern that violent conflict and terror-
ism are threatening the international system. These governments, most prominent
among them being the United States, have responded to terrorist threats by increas-
ing defense spending and by attempting to build elaborate homeland security
systems.
The United States government, which takes the lead in the war against terrorism,
is very poorly organized to employ development assistance as a preventive tool. Its
Agency for International Development possesses the core of knowledge and experi-
ence, but it is not at the cabinet level and often is not able to influence policy
decisions. Furthermore, many U.S. government departments and agencies expend
resources on development, but they pursue their domestic mission, have no overseas
presence, and implement programs with great difficulty and little effect.
    As has been mentioned, there is also little coherence in the approach of the United
States, and often its policies on trade and finance run directly counter to its develop-
ment objectives. There is a clear need for a new cabinet-level Department for
International Development Cooperation that would be built on the foundation of
USAID’s professional staff and would coordinate all U.S. development activities
including oversight of the UN voluntary agencies and the World Bank. The secretary
for this new department would also have a stronger voice on development policy
vis-a-vis the Treasury and Commerce departments and thus contribute to a more
coherent approach to the development agenda.
The international community cannot wait long for enlightened American leader-
ship in this crucial area. It is becoming overwhelmed with crises of varying degrees
of seriousness.  What does this mean for the next two decades when the population
of the world’s poor will grow exponentially?
The international architecture created after World War II has served the world for
over fifty years. The institutions and legal regime are already overtaxed.  There are
now four times as many nation-states as there were in 1945 and numerous radical
groups who pursue their objectives without regard for sovereignty, international law,
or institutional frameworks of any kind. The global community is suffering the loss
of “collective efficacy.”  This situation can only grow worse as the number of the
world’s poor increases.
It is long past time to acknowledge the link between poverty and conflict and to
act on it.  Accepting that poverty contributes to violent conflict will lead to an
inevitable choice: to target development strategies to prevent the disintegration of
social structures and trade and finance policies that promote development.  If we
cannot muster the political will to address the poverty-conflict connection, we will
condemn future generations to global class warfare, as an ever-contracting Western
world confronts an expanding and increasingly violent developing world. z
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